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PRIVACY, INTIMACY, AND ISOLATION. By Julie C. 
Inness.t New York: Oxford University Press. 1992. Pp. ix, 
157. $24.95. 
Daniel A. Farber2 
"Quagmire, privacy as deep." 
So reads an entry in the index of this book. Unlike most index 
entries, this one is not only useful but profound. As the author 
notes, privacy seems to be based on firm, widely shared understand-
ings. But "the ground softens as we discover the confusion underly-
ing our privacy intuitions." Indeed, prominent scholars have tried 
to escape the swamp by abandoning the concept of privacy 
altogether. 
Professor Inness's goal in this book is to define privacy and 
defend its moral value. She views all of the various aspects of pri-
vacy as methods of controlling intimate aspects of life. She then 
seeks to provide a moral foundation for intimacy on the basic 
human capacity for "love, liking, and care." She contends that her 
theory provides a moral basis for both informational privacy and 
what she calls "constitutional privacy" -the rights recognized by 
the Supreme Court in Roe and Griswold.J 
Part I of this review will discuss and expand upon Professor 
Inness's response to privacy skepticism. Part II will explain how 
her own view of privacy, while helpful, fails as a foundational the-
ory. Part III closes with a discussion of the prospects for a general 
theory of privacy. 
I 
One of Professor Inness's main goals is to challenge the "pri-
vacy skeptics" who seek to escape the quagmire by abandoning the 
concept altogether. Her primary fire is directed against Judith 
Jarvis Thomson and others who have argued that privacy is a dis-
pensable concept. Anything that is protected by the so-called right 
to privacy, Thomson argued, also turns out to be protected by some 
other moral right, such as a property entitlement. Moreover, pri-
I. Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Mount Holyoke College. 
2. Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty, University of 
Minnesota. 
3. I will follow her usage in distinguishing these two types of privacy, although her 
terminology is somewhat inaccurate, since the Constitution gives more explicit protection to 
"informational privacy" in the Fourth Amendment than it does to what she calls "constitu· 
tional privacy." 
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vacy skeptics have argued, the various instances of privacy rights 
really have nothing much in common. In short, the concept of pri-
vacy does no significant analytical work. 
In response to Thomson, Inness argues that some aspects of 
the right to privacy do not involve other rights. Although her evi-
dence is somewhat debatable,4 her point seems valid. For instance, 
the right to privacy clearly protects against a wiretap of a phone 
conversation, yet the wiretap may involve no invasion of the 
speaker's property rights. Also, as Inness argues cogently, privacy 
would not necessarily be a superfluous concept even if every exam-
ple of privacy also could be classified as an example of some other 
right.s For example, one reason for supporting property rights may 
be that they protect privacy interests. 
A related form of skepticism argues that informational and 
constitutional privacy have nothing in common. In contrast, Jus-
tice Douglas attempted in Griswold to link the right to use contra-
ception with the impermissibility of police searches of the martial 
bedroom. Although often criticized, Douglas's effort to connect in-
formational and constitutional privacy is not implausible. If we es-
pecially object to searches of the marital bedroom, we must believe 
that much of what goes on there is none of the government's busi-
ness. This belief seems relevant to determining the scope of the gov-
ernment's regulatory power as well as the scope of its investigatory 
power.6 
Abortion laws do not call for any searches of the marital bed-
room, but even so, concerns about informational privacy are not 
wholly irrelevant. A companion case to Roe involved the more en-
lightened American Law Institute's model abortion statute, which 
required that the abortion decision be affirmed by a hospital com-
mittee and that the performing physician's judgment be confirmed 
by independent examinations of the patient by two other physicians. 
These are rather striking intrusions on informational privacy, par-
ticularly because psychological, emotional and familial factors were 
4. Her main example is the right of the sender of a letter to control the dissemination 
of its contents. In our legal system, however, this right comes under the rubric of copyright 
law rather than privacy. 
5. The best possible classification scheme may separate entities with some similarities 
into different categories; we may well find it useful to observe these similarities across catego-
ries. For example, butterflies and bats belong to very different zoological groups, but the 
concept of "flying animals" remains meaningful and useful. 
6. The linkage between constitutional and informational privacy may work in the op-
posite direction as well. If revealing information about personal sexual practices constitutes a 
tort, at least one reason for preventing dissemination of the information is probably to leave 
individuals free from public pressure on such matters. 
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considered relevant. 1 In short, we should not be too quick to dis-
miss the possibility that informational and constitutional privacy 
are indeed linked at some level. 
Another critique of privacy has come from feminists. In argu-
ing that "the personal is the political," they have often denied (or at 
least seemed to deny) the existence of any genuine separation be-
tween the private and public. Somewhat contradictorily, they have 
also argued that privacy does exist but that it is bad, because it 
shields the abuse of women within the home from public scrutiny 
and control. Both aspects of the feminist position have recently 
been the subject of a thoughtful critique by Ruth Gavison.s She 
shows that most feminist writing, on close analysis, exhibits an ef-
fort toward a deeper understanding of the public/private distinction 
and advocates redrawing the boundary, instead of abolition. Those 
few feminists who actually seek abolition of privacy, rather than 
reform, have failed to make a plausible case. 
Other attacks on privacy have come from those at the opposite 
end of the political spectrum from feminists. Conservative skeptics 
argue that privacy is merely a personal preference with no special 
moral standing. Richard Posner has suggested that even informa-
tional privacy may actually be undesirable, since it allows people to 
conceal secrets and thereby defraud others in economic and social 
transactions.9 Regarding constitutional privacy, Robert Bork com-
pared a state law regulating contraceptives (to protect those who 
were offended by contraception) to a pollution regulation (protect-
ing those who are adversely affected by smog). He found no differ-
ence except personal preference between the two.w 
Posner's intensely skeptical initial views have been somewhat 
modified in later economic analyses. II The justifications for infor-
mational privacy are even stronger if we relax the traditional eco-
nomic assumption of complete human rationality. In reality, rather 
than responding rationally, others might well overreact to a dra-
matic episode of misconduct in a person's past. Cognitive psycholo-
7. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Similarly, judicial bypass procedures involve a 
judge's inquiry into the intimate personal aspects of a minor's life. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 
497 U.S. 417 (1990). 
8. Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private Distinction, 45 Stan. L. Rev. I 
(1992). 
9. See Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 Ga. L. Rev. 393, 399-400 (1978). 
10. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. 
L.J. I, 8-10 (1971). 
II. See Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28 Buff. L. Rev. I. 14-15, 
22-23 (1979); John P. Gould, Privacy and the Economics of Information, 9 J. Legal Stud. 827 
( 1980); Frank H. Easterbrook, Privacy and the Optional Extent of Disclosure Under the Free-
dom of Information Act, 9 J. Leg. Stud. 775, 787-96 (1980). 
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gists have collected a rich menagerie of human irrationalities. 
Among the most common is the tendency to overweigh data which 
is recent and dramatic, at the expense of more reliable background 
information. For example, people are more afraid of flying than of 
driving, even though flying is safer, in part because airplane crashes 
are highly dramatic and visible events. For the same reason, a vivid 
example of prior misconduct is also likely to be given too much 
weight.l2 Thus, restricting access to such information may be so-
cially desirable. 
Bork's position seems to view preferences as essentially fungi-
ble, whether we are considering the moralistic preferences of reli-
gious groups versus the preference of couples for family planning, 
or the preference of industry for higher profits versus that of pollu-
tion victims for clean air.n In this respect, his analysis seems con-
sistent with the general flattening of human values that often 
characterizes economic analysis. Since any human culture neces-
sarily treats some preferences as more fundamental than others, this 
rhetorical skepticism is inevitably jarring; Bork sounds almost like a 
visitor from another planet, who simply doesn't understand how we 
experience our lives. 
However useful this treatment of preferences may be for eco-
nomic analysis, it seems lacking as a normative approach. By treat-
ing all values as merely "tastes," it assumes that values cannot be 
the subject of rational discussion, and therefore must be treated as 
arbitrary preferences. Yet, we do find it possible to discuss moral 
issues. Whether the reason is that moral values have some objective 
existence or that our shared culture generates some fundamental 
consensus, we are often able to find some common ground on which 
to form judgments. 
Like Inness, I find the case for privacy skepticism unpersua-
sive. Apart from our shared intuitions about the importance and 
scope of privacy, the strongest evidence that there is "something 
there" is provided by the scholarship in the field. There have been a 
number of important efforts to provide an intellectual foundation 
for privacy. Although none of them has been wholly successful, 
they have uncovered connections between various privacy rights 
12. For a survey of the literature, see Jonathan Baron, Thinking and Deciding 198-217 
(Cambridge U. Press, 1988). 
13. Bork could well respond that he is speaking only of the requirements of neutrality 
for judges in constitutional cases. But if our culture embodies some strong distinctions be-
tween various types of preferences, it is difficult to see why "neutrality" should require judges 
to treat as identical preferences that are culturally defined as radically different. Treating 
unlike things as if they were alike is just as much a violation of neutrality as treating like 
things differently. 
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and have linked those rights to central cultural values. While they 
fall short of their intellectual ambitions, the partial successes of 
these theories indicate that "privacy" is not merely an arbitrary col-
lection of unrelated preferences for certain activities. In particular, 
as we will see, while Professor Inness's theory is only partially suc-
cessful, it incorporates some genuine insights about the nature of 
privacy. 
II 
If privacy is not an empty concept or an arbitrary preference, 
just what is it? Professor Inness rejects efforts to define privacy as 
the equivalent of seclusion. As she observes, it would be ironic to 
compliment a prisoner in solitary confinement on the extent of his 
privacy. Similarly, we would not say that a dissident enjoyed the 
luxury of perfect privacy if her government had banned all public 
mention of her existence. Thus, seclusion and secrecy do not aptly 
define privacy; there seems to be an important element of personal 
control as well. On the other hand, information control extends 
beyond privacy; trade secret law, for example, does not seem to in-
volve privacy, even though it involves control over information. 
Consequently, Inness limits privacy to a narrower domain. She de-
fines privacy as "the state of possessing control over a realm of inti-
mate decisions, which includes decisions about intimate access, 
intimate information, and intimate actions." In turn, she defines an 
action as intimate if it "draws its meaning and value for the agent 
from her love, liking, or care" for another person.t4 
This analysis contains some important insights. In classifying 
an action as intimate, Inness properly focuses on its "meaning or 
value to the agent." Thus, intimacy is not necessarily an inherent 
aspect of certain acts; it may well have a cultural component. 
Moreover, Inness also seems right to view privacy as relating to 
emotional relationships. Her theory fails, however, to account for 
some other important aspects of privacy. 
To begin with, while voluntariness is an important aspect of 
privacy, the concept of control requires elaboration. Privacy would 
seem to cover nudity as an aspect of intimacy; the Peeping Tom is a 
classic invader of privacy. If privacy includes the right to "control" 
visual access to one's body, then it should include not only the right 
to preclude such access but also the right to allow it. Yet, it seems 
decidedly odd to say that public indecency laws violate a flasher's 
14. Conceivably, these same emotions might have a nonhuman focus, as in the situation 
of a beloved pet. Although Inness does not discuss this possibility, expanding the concept of 
intimacy in this way would seem consistent with her analysis. 
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right to privacy. If anything, the flasher seems to be invading the 
privacy of others with an unwanted intimacy. In other settings, 
"privacy as control" fails to work because the conduct in question is 
inherently nonindividualistic: as the old saying goes, it takes two to 
tango. If privacy is defined as control and extends to marriage, we 
would have to say that it incorporates the power to control whom 
you marry-a right that no individual has in a society where mar-
riage requires the consent of both parties. Is We need to say either 
that privacy is the mutual right of both partners to exercise joint 
control, or else that it is the individual right to offer or accept 
intimacy. 
Inness's definition of intimacy also needs refinement. She de-
fines intimacy on the basis of emotional significance. But this defi-
nition seems both too broad and too narrow. It is too narrow, 
because such paradigmatically private activities as sexual acts may 
or may not be motivated by "love, liking, or caring," depending on 
the context. Yet, privacy does not include only long-term, emotion-
ally meaningful sexual relationships. On the other hand, this defini-
tion is also too broad. People express "love, liking, or caring" in 
many ways such as buying gifts or cooking meals, but these would 
not normally be considered intimate acts. 
Inness does seem correct in seeing privacy invasions as bound-
ary crossings: something that is normally part of the intimate 
sphere is involuntarily transferred to the public sphere. In part, as 
she says, the injury is that the individual's ability to manage her 
intimate relationships is damaged. But there is also a correlative 
injury to the individual's ability to manage her public relationships, 
and this injury may also be substantiaJ.I6 In our society, for exam-
ple, nudity often functions as a powerful symbol of intimacy, while 
clothing is an important method of creating a social image. Thus, 
requiring a person to strip both imposes an undesired intimacy and 
impairs control over self-presentation in public.11 
15. Similarly, if we define privacy as control over intimate affairs, and include 
parenthood as an intimate affair, we must also conclude that men in our society do not have 
full privacy rights, since under Roe women have the ultimate legal power to control repro-
duction. Classifying child rearing as an aspect of privacy also seems problematic if control is 
the test: after a child is born, as a practical matter, the parents lose full control of the relation-
ship, and instead are more or less committed to some form of parental relationship. 
16. As Bob Post has emphasized, privacy seems closely connected with our culture's 
definitions of social roles; an invasion of privacy usually involves disrupting an individual's 
ability to manage social roles appropriately and to thereby control her social identity. Robert 
C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 
77 Cal. L. Rev. 957 (1989) ("Social Foundations"). 
17. For instance, "dressing for success" won't work if others own your nude photo. 
Thus, privacy protects not just control over intimate relationships but also the ability to 
control impersonal ones. 
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Apart from these difficulties in Inness's definition of privacy, 
there are also problems with her attempt to demonstrate that pri-
vacy as so defined should be accorded any moral status. Inness 
seeks to connect control over intimate relationships with the nature 
of personhood itself: 
If personhood makes claims on the agent as both an emo-
tional and a rational being, it follows that an adequate principle 
of respect for persons must incorporate respect for each aspect: 
to respect another as a person is to respect her as both a rational 
chooser and an emotional chooser, a being with the capacity to 
make decisions with respect to her love, care, and liking. We 
must respect the agent's autonomy with regard to loving, caring, 
and liking as well as rational choice. Is 
Here again, Inness's analysis is both illuminating and insuffi-
cient. It is illuminating in its effort to expand moral personhood 
beyond simple rational autonomy. There is something lacking in a 
purely rational concept of personhood; this lack can be seen perhaps 
in the flattened vision of humanity reflected in some law and eco-
nomics analyses of privacy issues. Inness deserves applause for her 
efforts to supplement this vision of personhood, but she leaves her 
own vision almost undefended. Yet it seems vulnerable to at least 
two criticisms. 
First, it is one thing to say that certain emotional capacities are 
important moral virtues; it is another to incorporate them into the 
definition of personhood. In defense of this incorporation, Inness 
says only that we would question whether someone who lacked 
these capacities was really a person or was morally responsible for 
her acts. Yet, there are many other traits whose absence might give 
rise to similar doubts. Some people might question whether an indi-
vidual who completely lacked the capacity for religious awareness, 
or a desire to contribute to the community, or aesthetic sensibility, 
could be considered to have the full attributes of personhood. We 
are left in the dark about why, among the many moral virtues and 
desirable personal traits, the ones Inness identifies are the defining 
marks of personhood. 
Second, her treatment of these attributes themselves is off-key. 
In her defense of "liking, loving, and caring" as basic to per-
sonhood, she says that "such positively valued emotional states as 
these are not commonly viewed as manifestations of rationality, yet 
the capacity to experience these states still seems to be intrinsic to 
18. This passage might well be considered "Kantianism in a different voice," expanding 
Kant's effort to ground ethics in rational autonomy by adding an emotional dimension to 
autonomy. 
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personhood." It seems wrong, however, to view friendship and love 
as merely descriptions of one individual's emotional state. 
Consider the following hypothetical. A drug called Affinity is 
developed, which induces paralysis and also has some interesting 
emotional effects. In particular, if taken while looking at another 
person's picture, the result is an intense feeling of personal attach-
ment, which vanishes completely an hour later when the drug wears 
off. Many users develop the habit of taking the drug while looking 
at celebrity photographs. The government seeks to ban the drug. 
Would such a ban violate the right to privacy, ifthat right is defined 
in terms of "love, liking, or caring"? 19 
The reason Affinity does not seem to truly provide love, friend-
ship, or caring is that none of these are properly characterized as 
individual emotional states. Instead, they are emotional relation-
ships, which have to involve some actual connection between two 
people. Inness's definition of privacy is fundamentally individualis-
tic, revolving around an individual's right to control her own inti-
mate emotional life. But if moral value really resides in 
relationships rather than in a single individual's emotion, then the 
privacy right should protect relationships rather than individuals. 
Ill 
If her approach were fully successful, Inness would have pro-
vided a powerful theory of privacy. It would connect informational 
privacy and constitutional privacy via the notion of control over 
intimate situations, and explain why that control is entitled to socie-
tal respect. Her connecting links do seem to incorporate some gen-
uine insights, but in the end, they are not tight or secure enough to 
provide the kind of foundational theory of privacy she is seeking. 
But perhaps such a foundational theory is a quixotic goal. 
Privacy is the subject of a large and highly diverse body of 
scholarship. Professor Inness's work is in the tradition of analytic 
philosophy, as are many of the works she discusses; there have also 
been some intriguing efforts to bring the work of Foucalt and other 
19. One might argue that all mind-altering drugs are protected by the right to personal 
autonomy or even by the right to privacy. If so, LSD and other drugs would also be pro-
tected; the special attributes of Affinity would not be relevant. But assuming that this is not 
true, it seems decidedly peculiar to say that the right to privacy gives special protection to 
Affinity as opposed to other mind-altering drugs. Yet, if Inness is right, Affinity would be 
entitled to special constitutional protection because we have to respect the autonomy of peo-
ple as rational emotional choosers whose personhood is defined by the emotional states of 
"liking, loving, and caring." After all, Affinity would augment the power to choose these 
emotions considerably. 
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continental philosophers to bear on the topic of privacy.2o Other 
writers have looked beyond philosophy for insights. Economic 
analysis, while overlooking some of the deep cultural significance of 
privacy, has uncovered significant connections between privacy and 
other legal rules governing the dissemination of information. In 
Bob Post's hands, sociological theories of group interaction have 
illuminated the role of privacy in our culture,21 while feminists have 
uncovered some of the harmful effects of privacy in our society. 
The problem is not that these theories are unenlightening; the 
topic of privacy has not lacked for insightful analyses. Instead, the 
problem is an embarrassment of riches: too many incompatible the-
ories, each seeming to contain a genuine insight about some aspect 
of privacy. But to the extent they attempt to provide a foundational 
theory of privacy, each of these theories must claim to have identi-
fied the crucial attribute shared by all instances of "privacy." With-
out regard to the intelligence or energy of the theorist, such an 
effort might well fail for any of three reasons. 
First, it may be that there is no trait that uniquely character-
izes the collection of entities we call private. Earlier, I rejected the 
argument that privacy simply denoted an arbitrary collection of 
otherwise unrelated actions, relationships or experiences. It is 
tempting to conclude, as Inness does, that if various examples of 
privacy are not unrelated, they must all be instances of the same 
essential attribute. But this is obviously a false dichotomy. For ex-
ample, informational privacy may share some important character-
istics with reproductive privacy, which shares other important 
characteristics with the right to die, which in tum resembles infor-
mational privacy in yet another way. We may be dealing with a 
family resemblance rather than an essence. 
Second, perhaps there is some defining characteristic of the 
"private," but this characteristic has limited significance. This 
might occur because the characteristic deals with only one dimen-
sion of privacy: for example, how privacy is experienced by mem-
bers of our culture, as opposed to the rules that a just society would 
adopt regarding the same situations. Alternatively, privacy might 
not be the most important aspect of many private events; their 
moral status, for instance, might be more heavily influenced by 
other facts. In this situation, we would have a unified theory of 
privacy, but the theory would provide only limited insight. 
Finally, we might be able to identify a common characteristic 
that explains privacy, but we might find that we understood this 
20. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 737 (1989). 
21. See Post, Social Foundations (cited in note 16). 
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common characteristic even less well than we understand privacy 
itself. Because privacy does relate to fundamental aspects of our 
experience, we may well be unable to find anything that is both 
more fundamental and also more understandable. So we may be in 
the position of explaining the mysterious in terms of the utterly 
ineffable. 
Foundationalism can be a useful aspiration when it goads us 
toward the construction of broader and more profound theories. 
When it fails to produce the ultimate knowledge it seeks, theory-
building may still serve as a source of useful insight. But we should 
not be too disappointed that foundational theories like Inness's fail 
to capture the full complexity and richness of their subjects. 
